Culture, Civilization, and Theorie by Mukesh Williams
－ 19－
Abstract
The changing meaning of culture and civilization has made it rather difficult 
to place the twin concepts within a globally accepted context. Once we used 
these words for territorial and ideological conquests but now we use them for 
cultural domination expressed in the phrases such as ‘clash of civilizations’ 
and ‘incommensurable universe.’ Though cultures, languages and 
civilizations have been interacting and influencing each other from time 
immemorial, the recent belief that they are windowless entities has gained 
currency. There is also talk of a clash of civilizations between the Christian 
West and Islamic East. This ideological conflict has given rise to change, 
transformation and deconstruction. The traditions of western philosophy had 
further hardened exclusionist attitudes. Philosophers central to the western 
tradition such as Husserl, Heidegger and Hegel have thought within a Greek 
framework appropriating the identity of the ‘Other’ as ‘Sameness.’ This belief 
in turn has led to domination, conquest and colonization by the West in the 
nineteenth century and continues to shape the attitudes of many nations 
today. This false picture of culture and civilization that philosophy, ontology, 
politics and ethics give us makes us captives and prevents us from jumping 
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out of it. But postmodern philosophers have questioned transcendental 
universalism underpinning the cultural discourse by introducing relativism 
and autoimmunity. The rise of Anglo-American universities in modern times 
has made the two notions both a transmitter and interpreter of culture, while 
literary studies and cultural ideologies have given a new significance to 
cultural representation. The rise of cultural studies in the west and in Asia 
has been a reaction to the appropriating of culture in the name of 
consolidation. The essentialist way of constructing culture has given way to a 
historicist perspective of visualizing culture. In India the Nehruvian cultural 
policies of censorship and patronage during the 1950s and 1960s and the 
clampdown on cultural and political freedom of the mid-1970s led to the 
growth of cultural studies in the 1980s. The rise of popular culture to define 
national space can also be seen as a reaction to cultural regimentation. Inter-
cultural dialogues may be an ongoing process but cultures exist in a lived 
global experience and not in the politics of nations.
Our understanding of culture and civilization is of recent origin and dates back 
to the late eighteenth century. But during this time everyone who wanted to 
think, from philosophers to academics, have been involved in defining the two 
terms and have tried to understand what make them work. No study today is 
complete without a discussion of these concepts. And why should it not be. Lots 
of things we do, most of our institutions we create, the way we imagine our world 
are all connected to these twin concepts. 
The terms culture and civilization are the two most debated words in modern 
thought and practice and have been used by nations, communities and individuals 
as notions to create histories, identities and hegemonies. Are these terms residual 
essences, literary imaginings, philosophical discourses, anthropological 
constructs or graspable artifacts? There is no clear agreement amongst scholars 
as to what they imply. There is only an ongoing debate on the subject. Modern 
academic disciplines such as anthropology, literary criticism, history, media 
studies, sociology and political science are all involved in analyzing the process 
and representation of culture and civilization. Skeptics, cosmopolitans and 
fundamentalists have all argued on the subjects and developed their own 
strategies to further their agenda. Globalization and the digital media have 
further spread the ideas connected to the twin concepts, conflating them further. 
Today there is a surfeit of information on the subject creating confusion and 
anxiety in our minds as to which culture we belong to and which civilization we 
inherit. The skeptics believe all the talk about these concepts is humbug. 
Civilizations have always interacted and collided with each other, transforming 
and getting transformed in the encounter. All the talk about the two concepts can 
be dismissed with the words ‘this always happened, what’s new?’ The 
cosmopolitans welcome the spread of different cultures enjoying the rich 
multiplicity of the encounters. It is the fundamentalists who react with deep 
anxiety. The loss of traditional ways of life to forces of western culture and 
civilization is rather disturbing to them. Society needs traditions to sustain itself 
especially in a world of bewildering change. They feel it is important to return to 
purified traditions. We need to bring the runaway world to its heels. But can we? 
No we cannot. The world we inherit has been shaped by the twin forces of 
American globalization and digital mass media. Aided by these two forces, the 
spread of the capitalist neoliberal ideology has been swift and pervasive creating 
a new form of universalism. Many react to its intense force with overwhelming 
confusion and elemental violence. But the imprint of Americanism is 
inescapable. The incommensurability rather than symbiosis of culture and 
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civilization is the new political imaginary amongst the intellectuals and the 
fundamentalists. 
The battle over the definition and representation of the twin concepts of culture 
and civilization, which began in the Anglo-American world before the 1940s, 
and heated up in the 1950s, still lumbers on (Geertz, 2000 12-19). Old stalwarts 
like Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, Franz Boas, Bronislaw Malinowski and 
Edward Sapir have given way to scholars like Arif Dirlik , Arjun Appadurai, 
James Clifford, Sidney Mintz, George Marcus, Eric Wolf, Michael Taussig, 
Philip Bourgois and Nancy Scheper-Hughes. But there is no agreement amongst 
scholars as to what the twin terms imply. We need to interrogate these concepts 
as best as we can and once again in the light of new advances in critical theory 
and philosophy make some sense of both. The paper intends to show some of the 
debates associated with culture and civilization and the problem of arriving at a 
commonly-agreed definition despite the fact that dictionaries have defined them 
quite exhaustively. 
DEFINING THE TERMS 
In order to understand the concepts of culture and civilization better let us turn 
to their dictionary meaning. Both in the world of scholarship and media the 
terms culture and civilization are used interchangeably without the nuances that 
etymology provides. Hornby’s Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines 
culture as involving “customs and beliefs, ar t, way of l ife and social 
organizations of a particular country or group.” It further defines civilization as 
“a state of human society that is very developed and organized.” Civilization 
seems to posses normative standards expressed in the phrase “very developed 
and organized” and is therefore highly subjective, value-based and given to 
manipulation. 
Giambattista Vico in his New Science published in 1723 claimed that cultures 
passed through three different stages of development moving from religious and 
poetic to mundane and prosaic. As cultures passed through these three stages 
they moved from primitivism to high culture. In all these three stages, which also 
possessed sub-phases, a distinctive human nature survived. Vico’s dialectics was 
less to do with syllogism and more to do with the representation of reality 
through language. The transition from one phase to the other was embodied in 
transformations in the figurative language which in turn conducted certain 
“modifications of the human mind” (Vico, 1913). Vico’s categorization of 
cultures implied a belief in human progress and an intrinsic human nature 
leading to violent conflicts in history ranging from discrimination and culture 
wars to ethnic cleansing and holocausts.  
The word culture slips, elides and metamorphoses making it difficult for us to 
pin it down. It comes from the Middle English word culter or coulter which 
means a blade of a ploughshare. It was given a special meaning by the fourteenth 
century English poet Geoffrey Chaucer who talked about the coulter of destiny 
falling upon people thereby underscoring the unpredictable nature of life. The 
Latin roots colere implies religious authority while colonus invasion or 
occupation. Shakespeare saw culture coming from nature and in turn attempted 
to transform nature. Thomas Jefferson once quipped that, “No occupation is so 
delightful to me as the culture of the earth, and no culture comparable to that of 
the garden.” The connection of culture to agriculture and its subsequent 
transformation into civility is part of the changing social priorities of centuries.
The idea of culture as a way of life was connected to the Romantic anti-colonial 
belief in privileging suppressed societies. These meanings resurfaced in the 
twentieth century modernism in two opposing trends—first a belief in 
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primitivism and second the rise of cultural anthropology. In postmodern times 
culture was romanticized through an emphasis on popular culture. Today culture 
is often linked to issues relating to freedom, determinism, endurance, identity 
and change.
Culture was also seen as a conglomeration of aesthetic and philosophical texts 
often referred to as “high culture.” It meant some of the best works of literature, 
painting, music and philosophy produced in any given society. Using the same 
criterion, popular forms of music, art, literature, entertainment and publishing 
were all grouped under the category of “mass” or “popular” culture. High culture 
was seen as good and popular culture as debased. There was a time when people 
debated about high culture versus popular culture. T.S. Eliot’s “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent” belonged to high culture and his poem “The Wasteland” 
written in 1922 required James Frazer’s The Golden Bough for understanding. 
The penny dreadfuls of the nineteenth century and dime novels of the Victorian 
era would be excellent examples of low culture.
Culture had other meanings as well. It meant the shared values of a group and 
the way such values explained human actions. Post-war social sciences analyzed 
culture as a way of life of a group, community or nation that often determined 
their actions. But these actions were often localized and contained in a 
geographical region or a nation giving rise to soft identities and cultural 
syncretism. The reach of a specific culture was not global though there were 
shared indices. But with the spread of knowledge and news through the Internet 
it was possible to send culture globally and create a pan-cultural identity. 
Cultures which were once syncretistic became incommensurable. This led to 
deeper cultural conflicts between the East and the West and western disciplines 
were often blamed for privileging their own cultures at the expense of other non-
western ones. 
The western method of creating cultural hierarchy was said to lack cultural 
coherence and homogeneity. Together with this, uneven economic development 
and desire for a high standard of living gave rise to pan-cultural and religious 
identities. The shift from soft identities to hard identities and communitarian 
values was a function of the information highway and uneven economic 
development. These changes affected the social sciences as well. The methods in 
cultural studies including anthropology were critiqued and found to be biased 
and impractical. Often they were seen as unfit for academic discourses of society 
and culture. 
The concept of culture was no longer considered scientific but subjective and 
‘notion forming,’ whether we observed the bustle of a marketplace or the 
solemnity of a funeral, a religious sermon, play, political violence, city patterns, 
population movement or language learning. When we recognize these forms of 
life rituals and tried to convince others that we had understood something we 
were not telling details but showing the connection between a passing situation 
and a long story. Culture was now seen as a set of practices and the way meaning 
was produced and exchanged between people. When we say that two people 
belong to the same culture we mean that they interpret the world in about the 
same way. But is that really true in all cases? Probably not!
So if culture had to do with shared meanings, it also had to do with different 
ways of representing or interpreting the world. And since culture had to do with 
feelings, emotions, concepts, ideas and attachments there were obvious 
differences. Cultural studies helped us to understand cultural practices and the 
places meaning was produced through social interaction. 
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Meaning is also produced by modern mass media, by global communication and 
complex technologies. We produce meaning when we consume cultural products 
in our daily life, such as an iPhone; when we create a fantasy around it or 
personalize it. Meaning organizes our conduct and practice and lays down rules 
and norms in society. Different societies have different cultural practices as their 
rules and norms are different. And some of these practices are enforced rather 
strictly. They affect our behavior, life style and often our minds.
Though the term civilization is equally contentious, it has not caught the 
attention of thinkers the way culture has. The word itself can be traced back to its 
Latin roots civilis (civil), civis (citizen) and civitas (city state). Early use of the 
term implied notions of justice and civil society. This meaning changed in the 
second half of the eighteenth century to virtue and politeness. Today civilization 
is seen as an antonym to barbarism. The Scottish enlightenment philosopher 
Adam Ferguson explained that though individuals progressed from “infancy to 
manhood” the human species advanced from “rudeness to civilization—“Not 
only the individual advances from infancy to manhood, but the fpecies itfelf 
from rudenefs to civilization” (Ferguson, 1767 2). Ferguson therefore categorized 
the term civilization as a progressive hierarchy of growth and development from 
primitivism to good manners.
James Boswell tells us in his Life of Samuel Johnson (1791) that he wanted 
Samuel Johnson to use the term civilization instead of the word civility in the 
dictionary that the latter was preparing. But Johnson was reluctant to do so. 
“With great deference to him I thought civilization, from to civilize, better in the 
sense opposed to barbarity than civility, as it is better to have a distinct word for 
each sense, than one word with two senses, which civility is, in his way of using 
it” (Boswell, 1830 203). So already by the end of the eighteenth century the term 
civilization was beginning to be accepted, though with some reluctance, as a 
distinct word as opposed to barbarity amongst the English etymologists.
The ideas connected to civilization were further developed by Emile Durkheim 
and Marcel Mauss who saw civilization as large families of societies often 
turning sui generis, “singularizing” themselves and becoming autonomous from 
the parent civilization but still retained distinct shared patterns (Durkheim and 
Mauss, 1971 808-13). Johann Arnason cites the example of the Chinese 
civilization which dominated the East Asia region but the Japanese developed 
their own civilization sui generis. The Japanese adapted and transformed the 
political and cultural models from China into a distinctive civilization of their 
own (Arnason, 2002 66-91).  
The Japanese educationist Yukichi Fukuzawa (1835-1901) felt that civilizations 
were composed of physical and spiritual attributes. He felt that the spiritual 
attributes of civilization cannot be easily destroyed or changed. He defined 
civilization as,
not only comfort in daily necessities but also the refining of knowledge and the 
cultivation of virtue so as to elevate human life to a higher plane (Fukuzawa, 
2008 45).
Fukuzawa explained that civilization represents all aspects of individual and 
social life from “daily necessities” and “refining of knowledge” to the 
“cultivation of virtue” and the elevation of life By the term civilization one can 
distinguish two types of elements—those things which are externally visible and 
those of the spirit which dwell within. External civilization is easy to adopt but 
to seek internal civilization is difficult (Fukuzawa, 2008 45).
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Albert Schweitzer in The Philosophy of Civilization introduced the ethical 
component in his discussion of civilization. He talked of civilization as a concept 
embracing both material and ethical concepts. Civilization through this 
definition would involve progress in terms of social, economic, agricultural and 
cultural organizations as well as “spiritual perfecting” (Schweitzer, 1987). 
INCOMMENSURABILITY AND PERSPECTIVISM
In recent decades there has been an emphasis on “thick description” of culture 
and civilization which forces us to believe that cultures and civilizations are not 
essences floating in the air but directly rooted in well-established geographical 
and cultural codes. As such they encompass the political and religious conflicts 
of the times and are increasingly given to incommensurability, relativism and 
perspectivism. But cultures, languages, civilizations and traditions cannot be 
incommensurable. They are not self-contained entities enclosed by geography 
but interact with each other, crisscrossing, extending beyond boundaries and 
overlapping. Languages too are not complete air-tight units but open and often 
permeable. Since people speaking different languages interact amongst 
themselves, languages come in close proximity and tend to borrow from each 
other. The English language has borrowed from Arabic and Sanskrit and 
Japanese language has borrowed from Chinese and Sanskrit. 
Cultures are not static entities. Instead they are resilient monads, a kind of 
“living mirror,” representing the constantly changing universe with their own 
internal action (Leibniz, 1714/1989 207). The belief in sealed entities or 
“windowless monads” gives us a false picture of concepts that can hold us 
“captive” and prevent us from “get[ing] outside it” (Wittgenstein, 1953/2001 115). 
Karl Popper warns us that we must not fall a prey to “the myth of the 
framework” and become deluded (Popper, 1996).
CULTURE AND PROGRESS
Culture has also been seen as progress and development. It is generally 
understood as progress in art and science that has helped mankind to develop 
their faculties and character. But with the rise of eugenics and later anthropology, 
culture has been linked to the study of language, customs, beliefs, consciousness, 
ideas and practices of the non-European ‘Other’. Based on this assumption E. P. 
Thompson in The Making of the English Working Class redefined the concept of 
class as involving “human relationships” and not just economic and occupational 
indices (Thompson, 1963). He further argued in the “Preface” that,
By class I understand an historical phenomenon, unifying a number of 
disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material of 
experience and consciousness. I emphasise that it is an historical 
phenomenon. I do not see class as a ‘structure’, not even as a ‘category’. 
But as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have 
happened) in human relationships (Thompson, 1963 9).
According to Thompson class is not only historical in nature but constitutes a 
web of human relationships over an extended period of time. This could also be 
said about culture and civilization. Both are historical in nature “unifying a 
number of disparate and seemingly unconnected events” making it difficult to 
understand. 
Modern western disciplines have also been roped in to understand ancient 
cultures like the Indian and the Chinese. Some of the early anthropologists such 
as E B. Tylor believed in the power of scientific inquiry and cultural evolution to 
unravel the mystery of the development of civi l izat ions. The Indian 
understanding of culture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was 
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guided by Darwinism and positive science methodologies. It was therefore 
largely inf luenced by Tylor who advocated the study of ethnography and 
anthropology in understanding human cultures. Tylor used the terms culture and 
civilization interchangeably and saw culture referring to beliefs, laws and 
customs of the people. He wrote in 1871 that,
Not merely as a matter of curious research, but as an important practical 
guide to the understanding of the present and the shaping of the future, the 
investigation of the early development of civilization must be pushed on 
zealously. Every possible avenue of knowledge must be explored, every 
door tried to see if it is open. No kind of evidence need be left untouched 
on the score of remoteness or complexity, of minuteness or triviality. The 
tendency of modern enquiry is more and more towards the conclusion that 
if law is anywhere, it is everywhere. To despair of what a conscientious 
collection and study of facts may lead to, and to declare any problem 
insoluble because difficult and far off, is distinctly to be on the wrong side 
in science; and he who will choose a hopeless task may set himself to 
discover the limits of discovery (Tylor 1924 24). 
His passionate plea for scientific investigation and collecting ‘facts’ reminds us 
of Charles Dickens’s opening schoolroom scene in Hard Times (1853) where Mr. 
Gradgrind tells his class “Now what I want is facts.” The Benthamite 
utilitarianism became an important part of the scientific investigation.
There has been an overwhelming dependence on science and logic to understand 
culture and the human psyche. Edward Hall laments the debilitating and chaotic 
power of Western logic to understand and examine the world. In Beyond Culture 
he argues that, 
Two widely divergent but interrelated experiences, psychoanalysis and 
work as an anthropologist, have led me to the belief that in his strivings 
for order, Western man has created chaos by denying that part of his self 
that integrates while enshrining the parts that fragment experience. These 
examinations of man’s psyche have also convinced me that: the natural act 
of thinking is greatly modified by culture; Western man uses only a small 
fraction of his mental capabilities; there are many different and legitimate 
ways of thinking; we in the West value one of these ways above all 
others—the one we call ‘logic,’ a linear system that has been with us since 
Socrates. Western man sees his system of logic as synonymous with the 
truth (Hall, 1976 9).
Hall is saddened by the fact that in their search of order in the universe, western 
disciplines have emphasized the fragmentariness of the self rather than its 
integrative functions. And since the western thinking process is deeply affected 
by the linear logic of Socratic culture, logic is seen as truth. There are many 
other “different and legitimate” cultural practices that can use more of our 
“mental capabilities” than western rational mind.
 
Culture is also seen as a representation of human needs. In the 1930s and 1940s 
Malinowski developed his scientific functional approach to understand culture 
based on human needs. He divided anthropology into two parts—physical 
anthropology dealing with physiological structure and cultural anthropology 
relating to heritage, artifacts and values (Malinowski, 1944; 1931 621-23). In the 
1970s American anthropologist Clifford Geertz elaborated upon the symbolic 
aspect of culture arguing that culture interpreted the web of cultural meaning 
rather than laid-down scientific laws (Geertz, 1973 5). Recently Geertz has 
retracted some of his earlier statements. In his book Available Light he admited 
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that the fieldwork of an anthropologist lacked a scientific base and was not 
different from the craft of the novelist writing a bildungsroman (Geertz, 2000). 
But in subsequent decades his anthropological understanding of peoples greatly 
influenced the interrogation of alien cultures from the standpoint of the west and 
aided in the rise of symbolic anthropology during the 1970s and 1980s.
CULTURE AND THE LITERARY DISCOURSE
Intentions, motives and preconceptions began to acquire deeper significance in 
the study of cultural texts. The Geertzian method of finding indigenous cultural 
significance to the exclusion of social laws drew criticism from critics such as 
Roger Keesing, Dominick La Capra, Vincent Pecora and Aletta Biersack 
(Pecora, 1989 243-276). These critics pointed out that culture can be either a 
maze of “mystification” or a street of signification. It all depended on who were 
the people who constructed cultural meaning and interpreted culture. What were 
their ulterior motives?
Some of the questions that symbolic anthropology and literary theory raised vis-
à-vis culture also became important for the discipline of history. Hayden White 
in Tropics of Discourse saw literary conventions and linguistic constraints 
impacting on the writing of history (White, 1978; 1987). The historical discourse 
now became a narrative prose discourse that represented past structures as 
models in order to explain their meaning. In Metahistory, White saw the 
historian functioning as a chronicler of events that happened in the past and 
constructing a story from it (White, 1973). 
The controversy about the new methodology continued. The linguistic turn 
towards culture in history, sociology and anthropology was dealt with 
exhaustively in Beyond the Cultural Turn which analyzed different aspects of the 
narrative mode and offered a postmodernist critique of knowledge seeing the 
body and self as important sites intersecting culture and society (Bonnell and 
Hunt, 1999). Walter Cohen saw the new historicist reliance on “arbitrary 
connectedness” between different aspects of social reality as a significant lack of 
an “organizing principle” (Cohen, 1987 34). The concerns that the new 
methodology raised revealed the ‘lack’ of many things in the old methodologies 
but did not find a satisfactory answer to all concerns. The analysis of culture and 
civilization in the postmodern agenda became sophisticated but it was more in 
terms of negatives or what was not there.
Both old objectivism and postmodern relativism were under attack. In his book 
Tenured Radicals Roger Kimball found the tendency of new historicism and 
radical feminism to substitute sociology and ideology for literary criticism and 
literature somewhat irksome. “Is there something about the literary experience 
that transcends contingencies like time, race and sexual orientation?” And 
Kimball answered yes. The Western canon, which had been under assault by 
1960s radicals, was still central to a complete liberal arts education in the United 
States, an education through which students could explore the profound dramas 
of life and seek answers to our existential dilemmas (Kimball, 1990; D’Souza, 
1991). Dominick La Capra in Soundings in Critical Theory called the method as 
“cut-and-paste bricolage” (LaCapra, 1989 193; Callinicos, 1995). In the same 
book LaCapra argued for a dialogical concept of historiography that rejected 
both extremes of objectivism and relativism and campaigned for the “otherness” 
of the past and at the same time intervened theoretically and politically in the 
reconstruction of history. 
In Rethinking Intellectual History La Capra expanded on the work of Hayden 
White about the writing of history from a post-structuralist point of view. He 
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pointed out that there was a heavy dependence in the western tradition on “great” 
texts but often these great texts were subjected to “excessive reductive 
interpretation.” There was a derogative disregard by the western historian 
towards a “dialogue between past and present” which requires both “proximity 
and distance” to the “object” of investigation. La Capra elaborated his argument 
thus,
This dialogical relation between the historian or the historical text and the 
“object” of study raises the question of the role of selection, judgment, 
stylization, irony, parody, self-parody, and polemic in the historian’s own 
use of language—in brief, the question of how the historian’s own use of 
language is mediated by critical factors that cannot be reduced to factual 
predication or direct authorial assertion about historical “reality” (La 
Capra, 1993, 25). 
The concern that La Capra raised has affected western education and its 
methodologies specifically literary, anthropological and cultural methodologies.
The ways methodologies are organized and used are also contested along 
ideological lines. About twenty years ago this controversy entered the method of 
conceptualizing Western civilization based on the Aryan model of Greek 
civilization. In Black Athena Bernal contended that the roots of Greek 
civilization, was in fact connected to the Egyptian and Mesopotamian 
civilizations. The rise of the modern West has not been a pure, unbroken 
phenomenon that can be t raced back to scient i f ic and phi losophical 
advancements in classical Greece and Rome but to scientific and technical 
knowledge in China and Arab world. Martin Bernal’s Black Athena and Kenneth 
Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence have carried the debate from academic books 
to the web where the controversy still rages between a Eurocentric and an 
Afrocentric view. (Pomeranz, 2001 31-32). It is now commonly accepted that the 
conquest of the New World in the eighteenth century gave the Europeans an edge 
over the Chinese (Wong, 2000). The use of coal as an efficient source of energy 
by Britain helped the nation to overcome the shortage of food (Wrigley). So until 
the 18th century the West was not seen as a major player in science and 
philosophy or more advanced than China.
As western academia shifted more towards an Aryan model of ancestry it elided 
its African and Asian connections. Though Bernal has been accused of a 
‘confirmation bias’ and lack of strong evidence to prove his point, his thesis 
nonetheless has fired Afro-centrism amongst many intellectuals and disturbed 
the comfortable equanimity of believers in the pure Greek origins of western 
civilization (Bernal, 1991 443). The controversy has spilled over on the Internet 
where groups against this theory are trying to prove that Egypt was actually 
white. 
THE POLITICS OF CULTURE
A critique of state power, methods of individual subversion and construction of 
national identities and literatures deeply affected the understanding of culture in 
the latter half of the twentieth century. The notion of culture now entered the 
hidden politics of intention and hegemony of individuals and groups. In the 
1980s, as “the problem of ideology” gained wider acceptance in American 
academia, there was a marked shift in cultural and sociological analysis. From 
themes of sameness, cooperation and acceptance, there was a shift to difference, 
independence and hegemony. This led to an intellectual resistance causing 
national debates in the United States about the future direction of English and 
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American Studies and the humanities at large. 
Literary canons privileged a wide variety of political, racial, ethnic and sexual 
identities and literatures. These canons were passionately contested on campuses 
and in the media leading to a reprioritizing of funding in the humanities by 
government agencies, private funding bodies and the universities themselves. 
This gave rise to a new politics of culture which in due course displaced other 
dominant modes of cultural practices and ideologies. Within this climate, 
bounded by the extremes of containment and subversion, new historicism 
constructed its practices and located itself in the intellectual and academic 
environment. It is possible to see a clear divide emerging between those who 
campaigned for individual agencies fighting domination, assimilation and 
exclusion and those who valorized early modern state and its capacity to contain 
dissent, even if it in some cases actually produced, subversive forms of 
domination. 
Greenblatt argued that the ability of the status quo to generate subversion so as to 
use it to its own benefit highlighted “the very condition of power” that 
maintained the system (Dollimore and Sinfield, 1994 45). Analyzing the 
subversive nature of Shakespearean drama Greenblatt contended in “Invisible 
Bullets” that,
It is precisely because of the English form of absolutist theatricality that 
Shakespeare’s drama, written for a theater subject to State censorship can 
be so relentlessly subversive: the form itself, as a primary expression of 
Renaissance power, contains the radical doubts it continually provokes 
(Rivkin and Ryan, 2004 786-803).
Producing and containing subversion, the status quo or the modern state 
organized under a ruling monarch, mocks at the ability of individual subjects to 
counter state domination. But liberal humanists and cultural critics are alarmed 
by the containment-subversion approach. 
The liberal humanist was worried that since the dominant ideology operated 
subversively it could circumvent individual self-determination. The cultural 
critics were anxious if they could intervene successfully in ideological practices 
through discursive techniques. The control of subjects offered no hope for 
contestat ion or change by the individual even if there was histor ical 
discontinuity. 
Opposition to a “monolithic agency” was a political delusion argued Frank 
Lentricchia though Foucault advanced a more complex argument (Vesser, 1989 
234). Foucault did not see power as monolithic but multiple. He saw resistance to 
power varying in intensity and effectiveness. In “Sex, Power and the Politics of 
Identity,” he explained thus,
You see, if there was no resistance, there would be no power relations. 
Because it would simply be a matter of obedience. You have to use power 
relations to refer to the situation where you’re not doing what you want. So 
resistance comes first, and resistance remains superior to the forces of the 
process; power relations are obliged to change with the resistance. So I 
think that resistance is the main word, the key word, in this dynamic 
(Foucault, 1994 167). 
Foucault argued against the position of individual entrapment in the politics of 
power as the individual always possesses the power to resist. Foucault, therefore, 
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did not endorse the containment-subversion paradigm of power, but provided a 
more complex argument for both the forces of status quo containment and 
individual subversion or resistance. 
The ideology of culture was more complex than previously thought. In Marxism 
and Literature Raymond Williams addressed the problem of ideology by 
introducing heterogeneous and shifting ideological “movements and tendencies 
both within and beyond a specific and effective dominance” (Williams, 1977 
121). Williams maintained that the constantly shifting and redefining nature of 
“movements and tendencies” against dominant ideologies and against itself 
provided an ideological ground for both contestation and redefinition. Dominant 
ideologies were maintained by a grouping of gender, ethnicity, class, profession 
or age that individuals used as cultural producers. The ideologies were also 
maintained by the consumers or resisters of cultural production (readers/
resisters) and by the autonomy of the cultural medium. 
Williams explained that “hegemony” as a concept went beyond culture and 
encompassed a “whole social process” which included ideology. He argued that, 
“To say that ‘men’ define and shape their whole lives is true only in abstraction. 
In any actual society there are specific inequalities in means and therefore in 
means to realize this process” (Williams 108). Williams explained that specific 
cultures overwhelmed the individual to the extent that he was unable to think or 
act in specific historical situations. And this Marxist position challenged the 
basic premise of American cultural anthropology that individual agencies 
possessed the ability to act upon and change historical situations. 
Williams’ diluted Marxism saw hegemony as another element of culture, a 
necessary condition in the modern world to preserve peace, liberty and equality. 
He campaigned for intellectual autonomy within the Marxist and socialist 
frameworks and at the same time accepted Mao Tse Tung’s injunction that 
writers would be merrily absorbed in new ways of popular “collaborative” 
writing. 
An acceptable model of culture must employ the methodology of cultural poetics 
to incorporate both the dominant and subordinate ideologies that rise rise to 
identity and difference. Williams interpreted Gramsci to unravel the role of 
cultural practices influencing and transforming social systems which were later 
picked up by William Roseberry, Gavin Smith and Susana Narotskzy. In 
Williams’ own words,
Essentially, all three agencies—production, consumption/ appropriation 
and reproduction—are involved in the ideologies of dominance, 
transforming and getting transformed in the process. A dynamic model of 
culture involves a constant interplay of dominant and subordinate 
ideological positions that create identity and difference in an ever-shifting 
paradigm of cultural poetics (Williams, 1977, 110).
Both Williams and later Stuart Hall argued that though culture may not directly 
partake of hegemonic forms of power, it is nonetheless shaped by dominant 
world views. Therefore hidden intentionality becomes important in its 
articulation and formation.
In recent years cultural politics has tried to unravel the supposedly hidden text in 
writers such as Shakespeare, a text subversive of its own canonicity. The notion 
that subversion is clandestinely woven in the very fabric of texts might seem 
maliciously historical, but it is more formal than historical in practice. Jonathan 
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Dollimore finds the notion of a clandestine subversion in texts of famous 
canonical writers somewhat ludicrous. In Political Shakespeare he argues,
Nothing can be intrinsically or essentially subversive in the sense that 
prior to the event subversiveness can be more than potential; in other 
words it cannot be guaranteed a priori, independent of articulation, 
context and reception. Likewise the mere thinking of a radical idea is not 
what makes it subversive: typically it is the context of its articulation: to 
whom, how many and in what circumstances; one might go further and 
suggest that not only does the idea have to be conveyed, it has also 
actually to be used to refuse authority or be seen by authority as capable 
and likely of being so used. It is, then, somewhat misleading to speak 
freely and only of “subversive thought”; what we are concerned with … is 
a social process (Dollimore, 1994 13).
Dollimore explains that clandestine subversion needs a “context of its 
articulation,” which is historically verifiable in terms of its reception and action 
or supposed refusal of authority. In the absence of a context to speak of a hidden 
subversion is “somewhat misleading.” What we are actually dealing with is a 
“social process” not a subversive agenda. Texts are ideologically inscribed and 
when they show instability within the canon it is not that the texts are 
intrinsically unstable but the canon is badly constructed.
THE RHIZOME AND THE TREE STRUCTURE
In the late 1990s new perspectives in the archeology of knowledge further 
destabilized the scientific and functional understanding of culture. Western 
knowledge and categories have been constituted along a Hegelian hierarchy—a 
pattern symbolized by the tree structure with trunk and branches. Giles Deleuze 
introduced the concept of the rhizome such as a potato that “ceaselessly establish 
[ed] connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and 
circumstances” and like a “tuber agglomerating very diverse acts” (Deleuze, 
1993 30). If we sketch a rhizomic map of the world today it would highlight 
demographic concentrations of relationships controlled by a privileged few who 
imagine the rhizome as a hierarchical tree. It is not that a rhizome has replaced 
the tree but seemingly the tree controls the rhizome. However the rhizome also 
breaks free of such controls in its characteristic fashion as can be seen in cultural 
dissent and demand for political concession based on culture and ethnicity. The 
rhizomic view of a hyphenated world united by fast food culture may be good for 
business but it is not good for immigration. Developed countries seek to open 
borders for their French fries and electronics but do not welcome a reverse flow 
of migratory labor. The rhizome does not compete with the tree or is subsumed 
by it but fights with it for more economic and political space.
MODERN UNIVERSITY AS A SITE OF CULTURE
In modern times the university has become the “transmitter of a cultural 
heritage” and a site for the “production of knowledge.” It evaluates and clarifies 
the significance of cultural “masterpieces” and employs modern disciplinary 
criticism to identify progress, narration and understanding of the “cultural 
phenomena” (Culler, 1988 33-35). And since culture also exists in specific or 
general relationships—such as relationships amongst texts, between writers, 
between writers and readers and cultural knowledge interactions—the teaching 
of culture at universities, both as ar tifact and representation, acquires 
significance.
The teaching of culture implies that there are “objects of knowledge” in art, 
religion, economics and literature which can be objectively grasped based on 
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theoretical or literary paradigms. It also entails that there are cultural 
representations that can be evaluated and disseminated based on attitudes in 
different cultures. Diverse Anglo-American intellectual traditions, assumptions, 
ideologies and attitudes at universities have shaped our understanding of culture 
and cultural studies. Both literary studies and ideologies such as Marxism, 
feminism and multiculturalism have given a new twist to the study of culture 
forcing open hitherto hidden dimensions of culture such as hegemonies, 
intentions, social control and political power. Often cultural studies negotiate the 
difficult terrain of dominant and subcultures imagining discontinuities or 
continuities depending on intention. Changing demography assumes changing 
cultural hegemonies and lead to expansion or contraction of literary canons. 
White and ethnic heritages acquire significance in the West while Hindu and 
non-Hindu in India. In English Studies for instance diverse intellectual traditions 
argue their representations of culture often through oppositional paradigms but 
always within an institutionalized university structure (Smithson, 1994 2).  
HIGH CULTURE AND LOW CULTURE
Since World War I the terms culture and civilization have been the focal points 
of studies in literature, social sciences and anthropology, but the terms have not 
been defined precisely. So many things can be roped under their vast rubric 
ranging from symbols, languages, scientific progress to eating habits, dress styles 
and worldviews. Both Mathew Arnold and F. R. Leavis saw culture as a set of 
beliefs, ideas or values unique to a group or community. In Culture and Anarchy 
(1869) Arnold saw culture as the epitome of human refinement, as the “best that 
has been thought and said in the world.” However his concept of culture was 
elitist in nature which referred to the rarified activities of intellectuals such as 
classical music or haute cuisine. He contrasted culture with anarchy along the 
lines of Hobbes and Rousseau and equated high culture with “sweetness and 
light.” He argued, 
I have been trying to show that culture is, or ought to be, the study and pursuit 
of perfection; and that of perfection as pursued by culture, beauty and 
intelligence, or, in other words, sweetness and light, are the main characters 
(Arnold, 1997 51).
Arnold also contrasted culture with nature and saw primitive societies close to 
nature as uncivilized. This logically led to his belief in the theories of social 
Darwinism and cultural evolutionism.
Both T.S. Eliot and F. R. Leavis articulated their absolutist, elitist and 
conservative views about culture in both their works and public controversies. 
Eliot in his Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (1948) privileged high 
culture created by “superior individuals.” He wrote,
it is now the opinion of some of the most advanced minds that some 
qualitative differences between individual must still be recognised, and 
that the superior individuals must be formed into suitable groups, endowed 
with appropriate powers, and perhaps with varied emoluments and 
honours. These groups ... will direct the public life of the nation; the 
individuals composing themselves will be spoken of as ‘leaders’. There 
will be groups concerned with art, and groups concerned with science, 
and groups concerned with philosophy as well as groups consisting of men 
of action: and the groups are what we call élite’ (Eliot, 1948 36).   
Eliot believed in a sort of cultural elitism and preferred a meritocracy which 
would replace the class system where everyone was notionally considered equal. 
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Eliot’s ideas of cultural elitism was based on Leavis’s own concept of a 
Cambridge elitist minority in his book Mass Civilization and Minority Culture 
(1930) where he said,
In any period it is upon a very small minority that the discerning 
appreciation of art and literature depends: it is (apart from cases of the 
simple and familiar) only a few who are capable of unprompted, first-hand 
judgement. They are still a small minority, though a larger one, who are 
capable of endorsing such first-hand judgement by genuine personal 
response ... The minority capable not only of appreciating Dante, 
Shakespeare, Baudelaire, Hardy (to take major instances) but of 
recognising their latest successors constitute the consciousness of the race 
(or a branch of it) at a given time ... Upon this minority depends our power 
of profiting by the finest human experience of the past; they keep alive the 
subtlest and most perishable parts of the tradition. Upon them depend the 
implicit standards that order the finer living of an age, the sense that it is 
worth more than that, this rather than that is the direction in which to go. 
In their keeping.. is the language, the changing idiom upon which fine 
living depends, and without which distinction of spirit is thwarted and 
incoherent. By ‘culture’ I mean the use of such language’. (Leavis, 1930, 
3-5).
Both Eliot and Leavis felt that mass culture was antithetical to high culture and 
believed that mass produced culture based on commerce would destroy real 
culture.
IN BLUEBEARD’S CASTLE
George Steiner argued that we inherit the past selectively. Mythology, cultures 
and societies not only use the past selectively but compare the past with the 
present to determine their locus standi. Steiner pursued T. S. Eliot’s “plea for 
order” In Bluebeard’s Castle. Here Steiner praised Eliot’s “exceptional 
acuteness” in analyzing the concept of culture and intended to elaborate on some 
of the issues raised in Eliot’s “Notes of 1948” (Steiner, 1974 3). Steiner wrote 
evocatively thus,
It is not the literal past that rules us, save possibly in a biological sense. It 
is images of the past. These are often as highly structured and selective as 
myths. Images and symbolic constructs of the past are imprinted, almost 
in the manner of genetic information, on our sensibility. Each new 
historical era mirrors itself in the picture and active mythology of its past 
or of a past borrowed from other cultures. It tests its sense of identity of 
regress or new achievement against the past. The echoes by which a 
society seeks to determine the reach, the logic and authority of its own 
voice, come from the rear. Evidently, the mechanisms at work are complex 
and rooted in diffuse but vital needs of continuity. A society requires 
antecedents. Where there are not naturally at hand, where a community is 
new or reassembled after a long interval of dispersal or subjugation, a 
necessary past tense to the grammar of being is created by intellectual and 
emotional fiat. The histories of the American Negro and of modern Israel 
are cited as examples in this direction. But the ultimate notice may be 
metaphysical. Most history seems to carry on its back vestiges of paradise. 
At some point in more or less remote times things were better, almost 
golden. A deep concordance lay between man and the natural setting. The 
myth of the Fall runs stronger than any particular religion. There is hardly 
a civilization, perhaps hardly an individual consciousness that does not 
carry inwardly an answer to intimations of a sense of distant catastrophe. 
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Somewhere a wrong turn was taken in that ‘dark and sacred wood’ after 
which man had to labor socially, psychologically, against the natural grain 
of being.  
In current Western culture or ‘post-culture,’ that squandered utopia is 
intensely important. Our present feeling of disarray, of a regress into 
violence, into moral obtuseness; our ready impression of a central failure 
of values in the arts, in the comeliness of personal and social modes; our 
fears of a new ‘dark age’ in which civilization itself, as we have known it, 
may disappear or be confined to small islands of archaic conversation—
these fears, so graphic and widely advertised as to be a dominant cliché of 
the contemporary mood—derive their force, their seeming self-evidence, 
from comparison (Steiner, 1974 3-4). 
Steiner felt that the sense of loss that is now felt in western culture may a 
consequence of the “comparison” of the present with the past. The myths, images 
and symbols from the past are selected then forced to interact with the present. 
This process makes the present inane and mundane. Essentialism may simplify 
cultural processes but create incommensurability.
ESSENTIALISM AND CULTURAL HYBRIDITY
An essentialist view of culture generates exclusivity and cultural difference. 
Huntington’s argument of a clash of civilization carries the exclusivist and 
essentialist construction of culture and civilization to new heights, something 
that anthropologists, cultural studies experts and postmodern historians might 
not be comfortable with. In fact anthropologists have been arguing for the 
instability of cultures and civilization for quite some time now. Herzfeld from the 
same university finds Huntington’s intellectual postulate as a “Victorian 
anthropology in a new-Liberal guise” (Herzfeld, 1997 113). Michael Herzfeld 
distanced himself from both Huntington and George Bush Jr. when he spoke at 
Keio University-SFC a few years ago of the systematic destruction of Islamic 
civilization in Spain in response to my question about the viability of 
Huntington’s clash theory. He also wrote about the Huntington’s book as follows,
…. in this work, which lays out the reasons for which major civilizations 
can never find peaceful mutual accommodation, Huntington, like many 
others, has chosen to reconfigure the concept in precisely the terms that 
anthropologists have spent the last several decades disaggregating into 
complex and often unstable processes (Huntington, 1997 109).
If cultures are exclusive then what happens to hybridity, fragmentation, 
multiplicity, porous borders and disaporic mixing? The contingency and 
fragmentariness of culture is now pitted against wholeness and exclusivity.
Where should we draw the line?
If we delve into the rather sacrosanct nature of culture we can discover the 
imaginative, fantastic and coercive strategies of the elite classes to privilege their 
community and group by giving the word a narrow reading. Once we used 
culture for territorial conquests, then for ideological subjugation and finally for 
cultural suppression. Culture is usually harnessed in the service of nations or 
community groups to imagine their racial and linguistic purities. In our world of 
post-enlightenment, where individual freedom is highly valued, coercion, 
discrimination, ethnic cleansing of minority or civilian populations by 
governments, vigilante groups or communities bring up arguments about 
suppression of cultural, linguistic or ethnic uniqueness. Culture is invariably 
used to destroy minorities, justify ethnic cleansing and commit mass violence. 
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Even in a world of remarkable progress culture remains one of the most 
manipulated words in the human vocabulary. It is still used to control and coerce 
others who are not like us. The essentializing and divisive power of culture is 
further exacerbated by the culture industry and global digital technologies.
CULTURE IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
The problem of thinking about culture and civilization as incommensurable may 
lie deeper in the realm of western philosophy. Levinas has argued that the key 
philosophers of the western tradition, Hussrel and Heidegger, always thought in 
the “shadow” of Greek philosophy focusing on the most important paradigm of 
“the same and the other.” This dichotomy forces ontology, epistemology, politics 
and ethics in western philosophy to appropriate and reduce the identity of the 
‘other’ to the ‘same’ and justify domination, conquest and colonization. The 
imperialistic gesture of western tradition to reduce the other to the same reaches 
its height in Hegel’s imperative mood. Levinas explains,
The I not a being that always remains the same, but is the being whose 
existing consists in identifying itself, in recovering its identity throughout 
all that happens to it. It is the primal identity, the primordial work of the 
identification.... Hegelian phenomenology, where self-consciousness is the 
distinguishing of what is not distinct, expresses the universality of the 
same identifying itself in the alterity of objects thought and despite the 
opposition of self to self (Levinas 1969, 36).
Levinas cities the famous passage from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit to 
clinch his argument. In that book Hegel states,
I distinguish myself from myself; and therein I am immediately aware that 
this factor distinguished from me is not distinguished. I, the selfsame 
being thrust myself away from myself; but this which is distinguished, 
which is set up as unlike me, is immediately on its being distinguished no 
distinction for me (Levinas, 1969).
Levinas takes this Hegelian passage to imply that “the difference is not a 
difference; the I, as other, is not an ‘other’” (Levinas, 1969). The Hegelian 
paradigm is under attack from the other philosophers as well such as Foucault 
and Derrida.
UNIVERSALIAM VS RELATIVISM
In the last two decades debates on culture has taken a new turn by getting 
involved in an ideological conf lict between Hegelian universalism and 
Foucauldian relativism. Such ideological conflicts are intrinsically stimulating 
but they also prevent us from reaching a consensus between the apologists of 
western welfare state and communal economies. More and more intellectuals 
have come to believe in the need to secure social and economic well-being 
amongst peoples of the world. However this debate is becoming increasingly 
irrelevant as new liberal globalization and market economy take over the world 
as a new form of universalism. Globally, universalism has effectually 
underwritten national and international political agendas. This could be a 
throwback to the rather destructive concepts of ‘human progress’ and ‘human 
nature’ based on ethical values.   
It is rather difficult to define human nature through cultural value or some 
ideational structure. Derrida has shown that both universalist and relativist ideas 
connected to notions of justice and hospitality exist in a complex web of 
relationship that cannot be used to formulate political options. However in the 
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midst of this confusion we need to make “urgent” decisions. Culture emerges as 
a relationship with something that exceeds it. This excess Derrida calls 
autoimmunity where an individual works to destroy his own protection to 
immunize himself “against [his] own immunity” (Borradori, 2004 94). The 
concept of excess allows a narrow interpretation both of cultural relativism and 
cultural universalism. Both however validate their claims by keeping the forces 
of violence at bay. By emphasizing pluralism, cultural relativism protects 
cultures from being absorbed in a single universal whole. Levinas warns us 
against a single totalizing and overarching view of the ‘other’ which reduces the 
other to the same. The concept of universalism on the other hand postulates 
universal values to protect us from isolated cultural practices like sati. Well 
autoimmunity is not without problems either. It inflicts violence on the self by 
attempting to protect it. The autoimmune relationship both defines and 
deconstructs the structures of specific cultures and transcendental universalism 
leaving the cultural category rather unstable.
CULTURAL DIFFERENCE
One of the underlying assumptions of area studies has been the belief in cultural 
difference. After World War II, Western social sciences commonly believed that 
cultures were different and occupied different geographies, topographies and 
boundaries. These differences of cultures could be understood through “area 
studies.” In a world dominated by American exceptionalism and European 
cultural superiority, area studies gave Asian and African languages, worldviews 
and social organizations a sharper focus. From 1945 to 1989 American foreign 
policy used area studies to create its own picture of the world. But after 1989, 
many Left critics, influenced by Edward Said’s ideas of orientalism, saw area 
studies as narrow and biased. In recent years area studies have been reconstituted 
under Asian and post-colonial scholars like Arjun Appadurai who sees cultures 
and nations influencing each other and absorbing and transforming the processes 
of globalization in their own unique ways. 
The culture of another community may be attractive but if you wish to 
participate in it, it leaves you broken and sapped. Theodor Adorno wrote in 
Minima Moralia that “every intellectual in emigration is, without exception, 
mutilated” as his language is taken away and the “historical dimension that 
nourished his knowledge sapped” (Adorna, 1974 22). Immigrants often suffer 
from loneliness born out of cultural displacement and clashing worldviews. They 
try to imagine a cultural space in a foreign land to find a locus standi and a sense 
of belongingness. Transitions, diasporas, displacements, coercions, all create a 
yearning for cultures lost or left behind. They create cultural anxieties and desire 
to interrogate these anxieties. Some of these anxieties are reflected in the 
cultural turn of popular ideologies like Marxism or capitalism and the slant of 
academic disciplines towards cultural studies.  
COLONIAL IMPACT AND SUBALTERN CULTURES
Most of the studies in anthropology connected to culture and civilization have 
been ethnographic in nature and are embedded in the capitalist political economy 
of the West. Most of these studies have combined exhaustive fieldwork with 
archival work and sociological analysis. Those studies that investigated the 
colonial enterprise and its impact on other cultures invariably employed the twin 
ethnographic strategies of “resistance and accommodation” to colonial language, 
relationships and artifacts. These researches are not interested to restore lost 
cultural sites but only to map the changes in subaltern cultures through colonial 
or cosmopolitan impacts. The impact of postmodern methodologies on 
ethnographic studies since 1970s has brought in a global perspective of political 
and social systems on cultures and the impact of such systems on cultural 
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organizations, identities and language. Postmodern ethnography shares the 
foundational concerns of earlier research based on a connection between life and 
systems.
CULTURAL CLOSURES
When culture gets mixed with colonization or with the sloughing of colonial past 
by nationalists, it acquires the attributes of property and is subject to the “laws of 
ownership and inheritance (Gunew, 2000 100). Culture then becomes a 
marketable commodity, including and privileging some and excluding and 
disinheriting others. In recent years we have created cultural terminologies 
majority discourses, ethnic vocabularies, multicultural texts. In the Anglo-
American world the term multiculturalism has become a euphemism for the alien 
“Other.” 
In America it implies all the immigrant communities other than the Caucasians 
who incidentally are also immigrants and usurpers; and in Great Britain it is a 
sophisticated term for the Blacks. But it is not just race that imagines a culture 
but place as well that transforms it. In Australia or India multiculturalism implies 
the erasure of the aboriginal or adivasi identity and cultural histories. A lot of 
nationalist in the erstwhile colonies of Europe from India and the Caribbean to 
Australia and the Philippines attempt to remove the colonial stamp by 
reinventing, renaming or erasing parts of their colonial past, what A. A. Phillips 
calls “the cultural cringe” (Phillips, 1968 451). This affects everything from 
cultural histories and literary canon to renaming and reinterpreting the past. 
Not only reinventing culture but also reimagining the ownership of land to 
disinherit the original inhabitants such as aborigines, Adivasi or Ainu. In June 
2008 the Japanese Parliament acknowledged the Ainu as “an indigenous people 
with a distinct language, religion and culture. The Japanese Supreme Court now 
acknowledged the Ainu as the original inhabitants of Japan. In February 2008 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd apologized to Australian aborigines for having 
“inflicted profound grief, suffering and loss” especially by forcibly removing 
thousands of children from their families what is called the Stolen Generation. In 
India the BJP is attempting to disinherit the adivasi by calling the vanvasi or 
forest dwellers; the Congress wants to destroy them calling them Naxalites and 
Maoists.
Marking cultural difference within a national space has more to do with political 
positioning, privileging knowledges, representing institutions and societies. It is 
to do with homogenizing and totalizing those minority communities which resist 
the homogenization or totalization. Even when we do away with totalization we 
are left with empty spaces of incommensurable meanings. Homi Bhabha writes,
In erasing the harmonious totalities of Culture, cultural difference articulates 
the difference between representations of social life without surmounting the 
space of incommensurable meanings and judgments that are produced within 
the process of trans-cultural negotiations (Bhabha, 2000 312).
Therefore in the absence of shared cultural codes and meanings trans-cultural 
negotiations are rather difficult.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND CULTURE
The conception of culture as a growing body of scholarly knowledge is a function 
of our knowledge-based society. As we go beyond modernity and industrial 
economy into a post-modern world we are confronted by information technology, 
risk management and demographic movements. Central to these new movements 
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is the way knowledge about other cultures is generated and shared. The 1970s 
saw an attempt by sociologists and ethnographers to systematize the study of 
culture through direct scientific observation and the application of fieldwork 
research and lab methodology. Early work in the study of culture therefore 
focused on ca l ibrat ing the epistemology of culture by analyzing its 
underpinnings in a micro-laboratory. However soon it was understood that the 
changing global reality with new forces of knowledge distribution could not be 
reduced to a micro-lab. There were new macro-episteme that spread globally 
such as financial, digital, and disaporic practices and environments that could 
not be understood within the micro-lab framework.
CULTURAL BRICOLAGE
Bricolage is another term that has become popular in recent decades in many 
disciplines to talk about the natural mixing of cultures and civilizations. It comes 
from the French word bricolage and means ‘do it yourself.’ A person involved in 
bricolage invents his own strategies to resolve problems. Claude Levi-Strauss 
used the term bricolage to denote spontaneous connections in The Savage Mind 
(1966). Derrida expanded upon this notion by stating that bricolage implied “the 
necessity of borrowing one’s concept from the text of a heritage which is more or 
less coherent or ruined.” He felt that any kind of discourse falls in the realm of a 
bricolage. Later Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus tightened the meaning of 
the word by identifying it with modes of production of a schizophrenic producer. 
The word was brought into biology by François Jacob in The Logic of Life to 
reveal the biological structure as a part of an evolutionary history of an organism 
based on enzyme levels in cells. Jacob writing in the Preface to the book 1981 
opined that, “At the end of the twentieth century, it should be clear to each of us 
that no single system will ever explain the world in all its aspects and detail. The 
scientific approach has helped to destroy the idea of an intangible and eternal 
truth. This is not the least of its titles to fame” (Jacob, 1981 X).  His criticism of 
the scientific approach had a deep impact on cultural studies in subsequent 
decades.
CULTURAL STUDIES IN INDIA
The rise of cultural studies in India began during the 1980s as a reaction by the 
intellectuals and the media to the curtailment of freedom during the National 
Emergency of 1975 imposed by Indira Gandhi. During the Emergency both the 
Marxist intellectuals and political Gandhians began to feel the autocratic 
suppression of their political freedoms. Early in the 1940s the Marxists had tried 
to develop a people’s theater to combat the rise of fascism and develop a secular 
and progressive modernity by fusing modern vernacular ideas with folk culture 
(Pradhan, 1985). They based their People’s Theatre on the Soviet model of 
“socialist realism” (Mukhopadhyay, 2006 279). But after 1960s the mainstream 
Left began to concentrate more on electoral gains and not popular culture. Hence 
when the Emergency came it had no strategy to combat undemocratic practices 
and began to feel marginalized and ineffective. The Gandhians were more 
successful during this time. Under the leadership of Jayprakash Narayan they 
began to develop their utopian and spiritual politics based on Gandhi. 
Right from the late nineteenth century when vernacular cultures began to be 
modernized through the impact of British modernity via colonialism, both 
western modernity and Indian nationalism began to develop at tandem. After 
independence the residual suspicion of colonial rule forced Nehru to direct 
cultural tendencies under government-controlled organizations such as the 
Sahitya Akademies, National School of Drama and Doordarshan Broadcasting. 
During the 1950s both the radio and television, including newspapers to some 
extent, were controlled through national patronage. Therefore most film and TV 
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producers battled with state censorship through lobbies and sleaze (Prasad, 1998, 
88-116; Rajadhyaksha, 1990 34-52).
The progressive Indian middle class of the 1950s and 1960s, weaned on 
European rationalism, dismissed popular culture as irrational and infantile 
(Dasgupta, 1991). This middle class skepticism failed to generate enough debate 
on and literature of Hindi films, though the former was not only successful in 
marginalizing Hollywood in India but also creating a special place for itself in 
other developing countries as far as Nigeria (Larkin, 2000 350-78). Though 
initially South India and avante garde Bengali cinema challenged the supremacy 
of Bollywood they also remained largely feudal-based family romances (Prasad; 
Bhaskaran, 1981). In terms of popular culture Bollywood succeeded in creating a 
“nation space” in post- Independent India without the endorsement or patronage 
of the Indian state (Chakravarty, 1996; Vasudevan, 2000 130). 
With the general retreat of global Marxism in the 1990s, the rhetoric of self 
reliance and mixed economy also lost steam. Reformist ideas of economic 
liberalization were introduced to catch up with the blessings of globalization. But 
there was also a new emphasis on ethnicity, religion, nation and culture. Together 
with ideas of a global culture which globalization fostered, there was the 
triumphant Hindutva idea of a unified India and essentially Indian culture. The 
danger of a media-i-zed culture that was threatening age-old Indian traditions 
gave rise to essentialist arguments of an authentic Indian culture.
Together with a fundamentalist retreat into cultural essentialism the assertive 
identity politics of the Dalits brought in the Mandal Commission backward caste 
reservations opposed by mainstream Hindus. The secularists felt that ideas of 
cultural instability that ideas from the West introduced through multiculturalism, 
hybridity and postmodernism were more suited in a climate or ethnic, religious, 
tribal and corporate violence. To break barriers and merge with others was more 
important than to make hard barriers. However foreign policy experts realized 
that breaking of domestic barriers do not carry over into world of foreign affairs 
and international diplomacy. Multiculturalism and hybridity did not destroy the 
uni-polarity in the world or undermined the hegemonic power of the American 
nation state.
In the academic world too, the impact of the new ideologies from the West was 
being felt. Though American policy research based on the empirical positivism 
(based on state archives and party politics) still continued, the impact of 
debunking postmodern, postcolonial and post-foundational methodologies also 
emerged. Post modernist philosophers and thinkers heralded the demise of 
Enlightenment narratives like reason and progress. Though Pax Americana still 
ruled the roost (and as Francis Fukayama opined in The End of History America 
was the final-end state), there was less of fear of teaming up with the only super 
power. There was probably another reason for the change. Most Indian elites 
were disillusioned with secularism, Nehruvian socialism and nationalism. 
As third world intellectuals arrived in first world academia a new discourse of 
post-coloniality emerged (Dirlik, 1994 330). Dirlik argues that the postcolonial 
discourse has released the individual from the prison of the third world into the 
discursive first world of new ideas and episteme. The postcolonial moment is 
located more in an intellectual and literary discourse while globalization is 
rooted in global business practices of late capitalism. This could be a reason why 
most postcolonial scholars fail to interrogate the relationship between their own 
immigrant well-being and the forces of academic globalization. Dirlik writes,
Postcolonial as a description of intellectuals of Third World origin needs 
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to be distinguished, I suggest below, from postcolonial as a description of 
this world situation. In this latter usage, the term mystifies both politically 
and methodologically a situation that represents not the abolition but the 
reconfiguration of earlier forms of domination. The complicity of 
postcolonial in hegemony lies in post-colonialism’s diversion of attention 
from contemporary problems of social, political, and cultural domination, 
and in its obfuscation of its own relationship to what is but a condition of 
its emergence, that is, to a global capitalism that, however fragmented in 
appearance, serves as the structuring principle of global relations (Dirlik, 
1994 330).
With the opening up of the market economy in 1991 Indian business and 
intellectual space has become more global in nature. The Indian reality has been 
gradually transformed by the media and ideas from aboard. The weakening of 
state controls in various sectors and collapsing of national boundaries have 
opened up the world for the educated urban middle classes to conduct trade and 
find employment in the English-speaking world aboard. Even non-English 
speaking countries like China and Japan are beginning to be attractive 
destinations for both business and education.
In recent years culture has been interrogated along ethnographic lines as dealing 
with identities that are mixed and relational and inventive (James, 1988 10). Since 
global discourses are defined in terms of difference there can be no abiding 
continuity in culture or civilization. It is more a matter of conjecture than 
essentialization (James, 1988 11).
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
Today culture has assumed a new political dimension and influential academics 
l ike Samuel Huntington of Harvard University talk about “a clash of 
civilization.” He argued that that culture and cultural identities are shaping the 
world order after the end of the Cold War. At present the Islamic civilization 
poses a serious threat to America followed by the Confucian civilization. When 
Huntington’s idea of how in the post-Cold War period cultural conflicts have 
replaced ideological conflicts was first circulated, the U.S. administration 
distanced itself from his neo-conservative position that came close to the 
fundamentalist ideas espoused by many Islamic militant groups America was 
fighting. Huntington argued that there were several civilizations in history and in 
the post Cold War era conflicts between civilizations will become the main 
source of conflict replacing the ideological conflict between capitalism and 
communism. Huntington wrote that, 
The years after the Cold War witnessed the beginnings of dramatic 
changes in peoples’ identities and the symbol of those identities. Global 
politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines.... For peoples 
seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential, and the 
potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between 
the world’s major civilizations. The central theme of this book is that 
culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization 
identities, are shaping the pattern of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict 
in the post-Cold War world (Huntington, 1998 19-2). 
Many historians including my historian friend Rohit Wanchoo eloquently argued 
that it was not possible to historically endorse Huntington’s thesis of clash of 
civilizations either on cultural or economic grounds. 
What is in question is the very idea of civilization itself. Today the rise of the 
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modern west cannot be just explained as product of advances in science and 
learning dating back to classical Greece or Rome. Both Bernal’s Black Athena 
and Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence have argued against this interpretation. 
Now we are aware that scientific and technical developments in China and the 
Arab world helped the west to become prominent. The West has claimed an 
unbroken intellectual continuity without acknowledging the contributions made 
by the Chinese and Arabic civilizations. Wong shows that the discovery of the 
New World gave the Europeans a marked advantage over the Chinese in the 
eighteenth century. E.A. Wrigley argues that the use of coal by European nations 
like Great Britain to meet the energy and food needs of a growing population 
helped the West to overcome the Malthusian constraint (Wrigley, 1969; Wrigley, 
2010).
Today some conservative Islamic states like Iran seem to endorse the clash of 
civi l izat ion theory. Some years ago the I ranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad argued that if the Europeans committed the holocaust then why the 
“oppressed” Palestinian nation has to pay the pr ice. On a wider level 
Ahmadinejad pointed out that the West had harmed the Muslims by invading 
their countries and plundering their wealth. He stated that “If your civilization 
consists of aggression, making oppressed people homeless, suffocating the voices 
of justice and bringing poverty to a majority of the world’s people, we say loudly 
that we hate your hollow civilization.” Obviously this brought condemnation both 
from Germany and Israel, the two concerned parties and later by the U.S. So we 
might vehemently disagree with Huntington but he has his admirers not only in 
the Christian but also in the Islamic world. 
There might be some justification in Ahmadinejad’s argument as we see the 
American neo-conservatives creating democratic institutions in Islamic nations 
using military force as a kind of last resort or deus ex machina. It is difficult for 
either Americans or Iranians to claim that violence is rooted in their cultures. If 
Americans believe that violence is rooted in culture then this belief absolves 
America of any responsibility in the conflict with the Arab world. If Iran 
believes in the same idea then it absolves Iran of any responsibility in the wars 
America is fighting in the Arab world. 
To talk of a clash of civilizations is to assume some inherent and abiding 
characteristics of a civilization. The Islamic civilization is rather fragmented 
both in terms of nation state identity and ethnicity. There is a linguistic diversity 
and ideological agreement between many Islamic states. Even the interpretation 
of Islam has many different trajectories ranging from the conservative to the 
liberal. There is no common agreement about the concepts of jihad, fasad or 
fatwa amongst the Ulema. The Christian civilisation is equally a mixed lot. Since 
Henry VIII battled with the Popish Plot, the separation between the Church of 
England and the Church of Rome has been absolute. Also there is no purity of 
the Western Christian civilization which has borrowed heavily from Islamic 
civilization in the past. 
DIALOGUE ACROSS CULTURES
Today the nation state has become the repository and defender of culture. Is it 
possible for a nation to protect its sovereignty and yet assimilate other cultures 
through dialogue without fear of annihilation? Like all other nation states, the 
United States too, time and again, has raised the specter of external danger to its 
territorial integrity. Once the threat to America emerged from the erstwhile 
communist Soviet Union, now it springs from political Islam. The growth of 
Chinese economic and military power is also perceived as a threat to America.
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It is a highly desirable thing to have a fruitful dialogue between two different 
cultures and settle disputes amicably, but both history and philosophy teaches us 
that this is rather difficult. Culture involves the customs, beliefs, and social 
organization of countries or groups. Any deliberate attempt to suggest changes in 
another culture may lead to conf lict. Similarly it is difficult to amend 
civilizations, (change a way of life or social organization) through dialogue. 
Alasdair McIntyre explains that each civilization possesses a worldview in which 
another worldview cannot be accommodated at will. Each worldview is an 
independent universe rotating in its own orbit of beliefs, laws and values. Even 
Martin Buber, an outright champion of dialogue, sees dialogue as an ongoing 
communication and not an attempt to reach a conclusion or express a viewpoint. 
This terrible dependence in modern times to use dialogue to resolve intercultural 
problems has not been quite successful. The belief in the possibility of a dialogue 
between peoples and civilization has been a part of metaphysical humanism that 
Heidegger vehemently attacked. He displaced the question of praxis (to put 
theory into practice) with the larger question of Being (to give meaning to human 
action in the context defined by social norms). Ideas relating to dialogue/praxis 
resurfaced after World War II in the theories of the Frankfurt School but lost 
steam with the fading of Western Marxism in the late 1960s. The postmodernist 
went further by discrediting western rationality, humanism and Enlightenment 
ideas that once were the basis of a dialogue.
In other words, if we believe in then notion of “Dialogue across Cultures” we 
should examine both political and ethical questions that most postmodern 
intellectuals, except Foucault and Derrida, ignore. After the 1960s Foucault, 
Derrida, Deleuze, Lacan and others replaced old intellectual beacons like 
Adorno, Marcuse and Gramsci. In their enthusiasm to debunk Enlightenment 
ideas and humanism, most postmodern thinkers often ignore the foundational 
standard of critique, what Wittgenstein calls the grammar of critique. This leads 
us to two very opposite positions: firstly, those political and ethical norms have 
no rational basis (Max Weber) and secondly that speech and communication are 
based on rational norms (Habermas). The debate about the irrationality of 
political-ethical norms and rationality of language-communication affects 
dialogues across cultures.
Right through the study of Platonic dialogues, Hegel and American pragmatic 
thinkers such as Gadamer felt that the prerequisite to understanding others 
required the courage to test one’s convictions and judgments through an 
encounter with the other. This needed an imaginative willingness to open our 
minds to, and learn from, what the other was saying. Indeed, this does not imply 
an uncritical agreement but mutual dialogue. In the absence of courage, dialogue 
degenerates into a deceptive monologue where one is never at risk to critically 
examine one’s own convictions and judgments. 
MacIntyre believes that there is no neutral or universal framework in which 
language/vocabularies can be translated to evaluate rational claims by different 
cultures. He argues that there is always a possibility that we may fail to 
understand radically alien traditions, and fall in the trap of either assimilating the 
other in our categories, or rejecting what the other says as nonsense. The 
incommensurability of traditions and cultures forces us to live in a fragile world 
where disagreement need not lead to violence but tolerance of the other. 
Therefore we need goodwill, a degree of tolerance to encounter the other, and, 
through such encounters, to understand ourselves. Live and let live could be our 
motto.
The fact is that civilizations have always been interacting with and borrowing 
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from each other. The belief in the possibility of bridging differences between 
‘hostile’ cultures raises the more serious issue of a narrow interpretation of 
incommensurable religious traditions. Huntington and Lewis go further and see 
an alarming picture of Islamic violence and fundamentalism. To claim that 
violence is rooted in a culture is to absolve America of any responsibility in the 
intensifying conflict with the Arab world. 
CULTURE AND CULTURAL IDENTITIES
Stuart Hall has shown that culture or cultural identities are not stable entities. 
Though they possess a history they are always undergoing change. Hall states 
that, 
But l ike everything which is h istor ical, they undergo constant 
transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, 
they are subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power” 
(Hall, 1990 225). 
Change takes place through interaction and incorporation. It is possible to see the 
rich heritage of the past and the borrowing of ideas and skills that went on 
between civilizations in the past as a natural part of social interaction—the newer 
Western civilization took from the older Islamic, Chinese and Indian and now 
these civilizations are incorporating ideas of the West. But the rise of nation 
states in the eighteenth century and notions of political hegemony tried to 
undermine the symbiotic and often friendly relations between civilizations to 
advance nationalist aspirations. The rise of global economy and communication 
now undermines the hegemony of nation states and their claims of cultural and 
political division between peoples and their cultures. The Anglo-American world 
is perhaps the best example of the intermingling of many cultures and 
civilizations.
It is commonly believed that in their effort to globalize and establish global 
solidarities, weaker democracies face the dominating power of American capital 
and communication. In order to offset this problem economists have proposed a 
non-Eurocentric global model. Habermas believes that nations must develop 
rules to direct and monitor global markets and integrate it in a cosmopolitan 
political ethos. He writes, 
The idea that the regulatory power of politics has to grow to catch up with 
globalized markets, in any event, refers to the complex relationships 
between the coordinative capacities of political regimes, on the one hand, 
and on the other a new mode of integration: cosmopolitan solidarity 
(Habermas, 2001 57).
In recent years culture has travelled faster on the twin wings of economic 
globalization and professional class migration than nations, forcing governments 
to make efforts to catch up with the cosmopolitan community fired by 
opportunity and profit.
CULTURE AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES
Jameson argues that when communication—such as American TV programs and 
sleazy Hollywood movies—travels the digital pulse of technology it acquires a 
specific cultural significance that inadvertently suggests a world culture. This 
tendency is understandably viewed by most hitherto colonized nations as another 
form of colonization. Jameson sees the roots f mass culture in American Fordism 
which also becomes the sustaining power of American exceptionalism (Jameson, 
2003 69). But problems relating to globalization cannot be reduced to just 
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American hegemony (Appadurai 1996). Cultures are not static phenomena nor is 
global capital or communication. The post-global reality finds local cultures 
getting transformed by Western life styles and products while at the same time 
transforming Western products to suit their own needs. In this way a new form of 
culturalism (“the process of naturalizing a subset of differences that have been 
mobilized to articulate group identity”) now reconstitutes identity, shaped by 
mass media and consumer culture. As culture travels transnationally on the 
wings of globalization, it becomes deterritoralized and hybridized (Clifford, 
1992 96-112). Deterritoralization, 
creates new markets for film companies, art impresarios, and travel 
agencies, which thrive on the need of the deterritoralized population for 
contact with its homeland” creating transnational identities (Appadurai, 
1996).
We can see the movement of global capital and communication as a new form of 
borrowing amongst cultures.
Adorno and Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment present a rather bleak 
assessment of our “administered world” and see the ubiquitous presence of the 
“culture industry” in determining the value and meaning of culture and cultural 
products based on benefit and greed. Some thinkers believe that culture has 
acquired a greater significance in modern times than it deserves and that it ought 
to be pulled back to where it originally belonged—as the opposite of nature.
In the end we must remember that most of the eternal problems that human 
beings face in the twenty first century—such as famine, poverty, disease, 
environmental pollution, displacement of people—may or may not be directly 
linked to culture. Terry Eagleton points out that culture also has to do with 
memory, affection, attachment, relationship and intellectual enjoyment that may 
be closer to most of us than human rights or UN resolutions (Eagleton, 2002 
131). Levinas and Minsky would agree to this, so would a host of postmodern 
South Asian historians and social scientists.
Civilizations and cultures function within the realm of lived experience of 
peoples. Britain in the nineteenth century and United States in the twentieth 
century are the best examples to demonstrate this thesis. Intended dialogues 
between civilizations are hard to conduct as they are limited by many factors 
including values, beliefs, and incommensurable worldviews. But whenever 
civilizations have been in close proximity they have profited from each other, 
enriching their cultures and organizations. This continues to be the case even 
now. The conflicts as they exist in the world today are more transnational in 
nature and less trans-civilizational. The clash is more a function of economic 
greed and desire to reduce the ‘Other’ to an imagined sameness. The western 
imperative mood must give way to a questioning mind and take the best from 
syncretism and fusion of worldviews.
CONCLUSION
The culture debates of the last few decades at universities and the media between 
modern universalism and postmodern relativism still haunt us. Seeking cultural 
uniqueness or lack of it, we often refuse to recognize a common political ground 
between those who believe in the western welfare state and those who protect 
communal economies. The world is increasingly knit together by a global 
capitalist economy though neoliberal globalization has undoubtedly increased 
inequalities as documented by various studies (Thurow, 1996 383; Stiglitz, 2003; 
Bagchi, 2002) This suggests the realization of social security and economic 
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protection to the disadvantaged (Goodhart, 2003 935 and 961). This argument 
might seem as another neoliberal attempt at a universalizing discourse in the 
culture debate but uneven economic development and standard of living are real 
issues for most people across the globe and often transcend culture and 
ideologies.
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